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The original purpose of this paper was to see why the Phillips Curve numbers seem to 
be so much worse for the EMU countries than the United States since EMU was began 
operation in 1990. The problem is that there is no evidence of a Phillips curve 
relationship in EMU or in the United States during this seventeen year period. As can be 
seen in Figures I and 2, it just is not there. In about half the years unemployment and 
inflation moved in the opposite direction, as Phillips would predict, but in other half of 
the years they moved in the same direction. This may be a matter of time lags, with 
unemployment lagging inflation, but it seems clear that the Phillips curve is a poor tool 
for explaining these year to year outcomes in Europe or the United States. 
Insert Figures I and 2. 
EMU displays a behavioral pattern that looks like a Phillips curve from 1990 to 
1994, with inflation falling and unemployment rising, but then reverses course with a 
continuing decline in inflation while unemployment also falls in 1995 through the end of 
the decade. This pattern replicates what happened in the United States in the 1980s. 
Unemployment rose while inflation declined in 1979 through 1983 which matches the 
Phillips curve, but unemployment falls while inflation remains low for much of the rest 
of the decade. Neither the United States or EMU produce results which really support 
the Phillips curve. The numbers, however, are considerably worse for EMU than for this 
country, inflation being slightly worse but unemployment much worse in Europe. 
Inflation averaged 3.2 percent in EMU and 2.8 percent in the United States during 
the seventeen years, a difference of only 0.4 percent. Unemployment, however, averaged 
8.6 percent in EMU compared to 5.5 percent in the United States over the same period, a 
difference of3.1 percentage points, a much wider gap. 
The European Central Bank appears to be much tougher on inflation and less intense 
on the subject of unemployment than is the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee. 
This may be because of the wording of the Maastrict Agreement, which is very firm and 
explicit on the subject of inflation, but which says little about unemployment. The 
relevant U.S. law, however puts equal stress on the two issues. The ECB operates under 
the presumption that its primary focus is controlling inflation, while the FOMC operates 
with more balanced views. The fact the nominees to the Board of Governors must be 
confirmed by the U.S. Senate, where unemployment is a very important topic, while there 
is no such confirmation procedure in EMU may also affect policies. Members ofthe 
Governing Council of the ECB are isolated from domestic politics and need pay no 
attention to the wishes of the voters. Members of the FOMC understand that the 
Congress created the Fed and could limit its powers by legislation. The public and the 
Congress were very unhappy with Paul Volker's tightening in the early 1980s which 
produced an unemployment rates that peaked at over I 0 percent, and there was 
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1990 8.28 5.221682 
1991 8.92 4.648529 
1992 9.735 4.173326 
1993 11.05909 3.468189 
1994 11.76264 2.923644 
1995 11.42636 2.600346 
1996 11.33027 2.161524 
1997 10.87836 1.668128 
1998 9.807 1.516072 
1999 9.358 1.36712 
2000 8.367 2.861569 
2001 8.017 3.104334 
2002 8.292 2.578669 
2003 8.842 2.259388 
2004 8.892 2.024534 
2005 8.5 2.295267 
2006 7.825 2.284775 
2007 7.117 2.528911 
2008 7.125 3.8 
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US unemployment rate US inflation rate 
1990 5.617 5.121516 
1991 6.817 4.062509 
1992 7.508 2.940423 
1993 6.9 2.866848 
1994 6.083 2.540753 
1995 5.61 2.729053 
1996 5.42 2.84786 
1997 4.9 2.283965 
1998 4.51 1.528603 
1999 4.2 2.140944 
2000 4 3.266998 
2001 4.7 2.748329 
2002 5.78 1.561412 
2003 5.99 2.219458 
2004 5.533 2.607396 
2005 5.1 3.281898 
2006 4.617 3.124677 
2007 4.6 2.773899 
2008 5.7 3.304455 
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widespread discussion of 'doing something' about his policies. It may be that the timing 
of the easing ofU.S. monetary policy in 1983 was affected by this political pressure. 
Volker certainly did not want to be remembered at the Chairman who lost the Fed's 
independence and probably acted to calm the atmosphere. As an economist at the Fed in 
the mid-1960s, I certainly remember the pressures from the chair of Banking and 
Currency Committee, a rather extreme populist named Wright Patmen, to ease money 
and the fear which he engendered at 21" Street and Constitution Ave .. The Fed lives in a 
political world, while the ECB is far more isolated from politics. The people nominated 
to the Board of Governors are likely to be far more politically astute than are people in 
leadership positions at the ECB. The Fed is not controversial at present, although that 
could change if a deep recession develops. The ECB has no such fears, and has 
frequently indicated a lack interest is softening policy in response to growing 
unemployment The French and Italian governments can complain loudly about the 
ECB's firm policies, but the leadership of that institution is under no requirement to pay 
the slightest attention to their wishes. And attention is not paid. 
These arrangements are in part the result of German pressures at the time the 
Maastrict agreement was set. Germany, with its anti-inflationary attitudes was very 
fearful of Italian and/or French influence over the German money supply. 'Italian 
monetary' policy was seen as a horror. The Germans went along with EMU only with 
the understanding that they would be protected from their colleagues to the south. The 
fact that other countries to the south and east might be admitted and have votes on the 
Governing Council, stiffened their resolve. 
The institutional arrangements for EMU create an anti-inflationary bias that is far 
firmer than in the Federal Reserve System. The inflationary experiences of the post-
WWII era had quite a bit to do with this, European, inflation being 
worse than ours in that era. Europe has a long history of bad inflation after wars. which 
we happily lack, and memories are long on that side of the Atlantic. 
Overall Economic Performance in EMU 
It was noted earlier that both inflation and unemployment were worse in Europe than 
here during the 17 year period, with unemployment being particularly bad in Europe. 
Unemployment average 8.6 percent in Europe compared to only 5.5 percent here over 
the seventeen years. If the misery index is taken to be the total of the inflation rate an 
unemployment, that number averaged 11.8 percent in Europe and 8.3 percent in the 
United States, a difference of over 3 percentage points over the period favoring the 
United States. This striking difference raises the obvious question as to which outcomes 
should be so much worse over there than here. Our economic institutions and goals 
would appear to be quite similar, so why are such differences in outcomes? 
There are many possible causes, more than one of which may operating. First, 
labor unions play very different roles in the two economies. A few decades ago, over 30 
percent of the U. S. labor force was unionized, creating a strong bias toward higher wages 
and prices, and higher unemployment. Unions now represent only 11 percent of the labor 
force and they are down to about 9 percent in the private sector, government being the 
only segment of the economy (school teachers, and other local government employees) 
where they have had membership gains. The U.S. private economy now has a highly 
competitive labor market, which improves the unemployment/inflation situation. This 
has occurred in part because U.S many employers have moved to states with strong anti-
union attitudes. particularly the south east. These states have right to work laws, which 
severely limit union activity. There are, of course, no right to work laws in Europe. 
Whiles unions have also declined in Europe, the loss of membership is much smaller 
and they started from a stronger base. Unions remain very powerful in EMU countries, 
which considerably worsens the inflation/unemployment situation. It may be, however, 
that the slow decline in union membership in Europe will eventually make their labor 
markets more similar to ours. The continuing movement of European manufacturing to 
the east, where labor markets are more competitive, may accelerate this trend. For the 
time being, however, unions remain a considerable barrier to improved economic 
performance in EMU. lnthe United States, in contrast, unions are almost irrelevant in 
the private economy. 
Europe's difficulties are increased by 'soft' unemployment insurance laws and by 
very generous transfer payment of all types. EMU citizens simply do not have the 
personal financial pressure to be employed that Americans face. The government 
provides so much, and taxes are so high (over 50 percent average in some countries) that 
the incentives for work are weak. This, however, however, may be changing. Stories 
about Dutch unemployment checks being sent to the Baleric Islands in the winter became 
a widespread source of humor, and the Hague has actually become somewhat tougher. 
There is now real pressure for the unemployed to get training and then to find jobs, and 
unemployment checks are no longer sent to sunny Spanish islands in the winter. These 
pressures have not extended to France, where their mere suggestion would probably 
cause riots, but there is increasing understanding in much of Europe that generosity to the 
non-employed had become excessive. Its costs were an excessive burden on taxpayers, 
and it discouraged work and entrepreneurship. 
The arrival of eastern European countries, which are much tougher and more 
competitive, in the European Community has had effects to the west. If the French and 
the Germans do not care to work harder at lower cost, the Czechs and Poles will be happy 
to take their jobs. Germany which is next door to the Czech Republic, is a major source 
of shifting employment. A German businessman noted that he pays $35 per hour in 
Bavaria for workers when people who are just as skilled and productive are available a 
few miles away in western Bohemia for $10. The western part of the Czech Republic is 
now heavily populated by German and other western firms who have fled to the east. As 
the Czech Republic becomes more expensive, Slovakia, Poland. and their neighbors 
become more attractive. Eventually labor costs will converge, but that will take many 
years, and in the meantime many will have moved to the east. 
It is a fascinating irony that the collapse of communism created a group of highly 
competitive industrial countries that are forcing western Europe to improve 
macroeconomic performance. The Czechs and their neighbor are convinced that they can 
out-compete Germany, France, et. al., and thus far their confidence seems well placed. 
The American left, which has viewed the western European social welfare model as an 
ideal, how looks rather silly. Marx and Stalin must be spinning in their graves. 
